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l'N THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
BENNETT ASSOCIATION ) 
a Massachusetts business tr~st, 
Plaintiff, 
I, 
\ -vs. -
8TATE TAX COMMISSION OF ) 
UTAH, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT 
Case No. 
10682 
STATEMENT OF THE GASE 
This is an original proceeding to review an order 
and decision of the State Tax Commission upholding a 
franchise tax deficiency against Bennett Association in 
the amount of $73,029.02. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff herein, Bennett Association, is a Mas-
sachusetts business trust with its principal place of busi-
ness in Salt Lake City, Utah. At all times mentioned 
herein Plaintiff owned more than 95% of the outstanding 
stock of Bennett Leasing Company, Utah Auto Rentals 
and Bennett's, a Utah corporation. 
On or before April 15, 1965, the Plaintiff filed a 
eonsolidated corporation franchise tax return for its 
2 
January 1, 19G.f, to DPcember 31, 1%-±, t·ah.•ndar year, 
and included tlwn~in the• income of Utah Auto Rentals 
and Bennett Leasing Company. Ho\\·ever, it failed to 
include the income of Bemwtt 's and did not include a 
consent from the latter corporation to the filing of a 
consolidated return on its bt>half. Had the return been 
filed in a proper and timely fashion, it would have shown 
that on .March 31, l!JG.f, Benm·tt 's made a liquidating 
distribution of all of its a::.;sets to the BC'nnett Associ-
ation in accordance with a plan of li(1uidation and dis-
solution. This liquidating distribution was computed on 
the fair market value of asset::.; transf ern·d from Ben-
nett's to the Plaintiff in the amount of $1,7GG,362.80. A 
franchise tax deficiency ha::.; bePn ::.;nstained by the State 
Tax Commission upon this income to Bennett Association 
in the amount of $70,559.-1-±, together with interest there-
on in the amount of $2,-±69.58 for a total deficiency of 
$73,029.02. 
The Commission held that the Plaintiff was not en-
titled to claim the benefits of filing a consolidated return 
with its dissolved ~mbsidiary and rulPd that the liqui-
dating distribution which it received from this subsidi-
ary was taxable to the parent corporation. It is this rul-
ing that Plaintiff asks this court to review. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ONLY AN AFFILIATED CORPORATION HAVING A 
TAXABLE YEAR OF ITS OWN CAN BE ACCORDED THE 
PRIVILEGE OF JOINING IN A CONSOLIDATED RETURN 
FOR THAT YEAR SO AS TO QUALIFY FOR AN INTER-
COMPANY TRANSACTION EXEMPTION. 
3: 
As a general 1ule the liquidating dividend paid from 
a subsidiary to a parent in the State of Utah is taxable 
to the parent. Such a distribution is required to be 
included in the gross income of the parent and after 
taking into consideration certain adjustments on the 
basis of property involved, it is taxable as income to the 
parent corporation. See Sec. 59-13-5 UCA 1953. 
Amounts distributed in complete liquidation of a 
corporation are treated as full payment in exchange 
for stock and are taxable to the distributee. See 59-13-14 
UCA 1953. 
It must be noted that 1964 was not a taxable year 
for Bennett's under Sec. 59-13-1 (6), UCA 1953. This 
section provides : 
"The term 'taxable year' means the calendar year 
or the fiscal year ending during such calendar 
year upon the basis of which the net income is 
computed and includes, in the case of a return 
made for a fractional part of a year under the 
provisions of this chapter, or under regulations 
prescribed by the Tax 1Commission, the period 
for which such return is made ... " 
The franchise tax in Utah is a tax on the privilege 
of doing business measured by income and is a prepaid 
tax. Sec. 59-13-3, UCA 1953, provides that every corpo-
ration'' for the privilege of exercising its corporate fran-
chise or the privilege of doing business in the state shall 
annually pay to this state a tax equal to 4% of its net 
income for the preceeding taxable year, computed and 
allocated to this state in the manner hereinafter pro-
vided ... " (Emphasis suppled.) Thus, 1964 was not a 
taxable year for Benm·tt's even though it may otherwise 
be a member of the consolidated group in question. 
It should not be allowed to join in a consolidated 
return for the year 196-1- because the privilege of making 
a consolidated return for any taxable year is only granted 
to members of an affiliated group in place of the indi-
vidual returns which the members of that group would 
otherwise be n'quired to file. A corporation which owes 
no return cannot participate in the filing of a joint return 
or a consolidated return ~with other corporations. And, 
as Regulation 4 only begins to operate after the existence 
of a consolidated return privilege is established, it seems 
clear that a group of corporations not entitled to file a 
consolidated return under the statute cannot claim a 
consolidated return exemption under isolated portions 
of the regulation. 
In the year 1964- Bennett's paid to the Bennett 
Association a liquidating dividend which is taxable under 
Utah law unless an exemption is available to the parent 
which would prevent this dividend from being included 
in the tax return filed for or by the parent. 
The only special tax consideration available is that 
provided by Franchise Tax Regulation No. 4, Article 
34, which states: 
"Gain or loss shall not be recognized upon a dis-
tribution during a consolidated return period by 
a member of an affiliated group to another mem-
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ber of such group in cancellation or redemption 
of stock; and any such distribution shall be con-
::,;idered an intercompany transaction." 
'l'hus, while no statutory exemption is provided, the 
Plaintiff herein contends that the distribution which it 
received from its subsidiary should be treated as an in-
kreompany transaction and that it need not report such 
a liquidating dividend as income. 
A determination of the propriety of this contention 
necessarily involves inquiry into the nature of consoli-
dated returns and affiliated groups as defined by Utah 
statutes. 
Sec. 59-13-2:3, UCA 1953, defines affiliated group in 
Utah and under the general definition contained there, 
it is p1·obable that Bennett's would be a member of an 
affiliated group in 1964 even though it dissolved in 
"Thfarch of that year. However, Sec. 59-13-23, UCA 1953, 
further provides that an affiliated group shall have the 
lJrivilege of making a consolidated return "for arny tax-
able year in lieu of sepa.rate returns." (Emphasis sup-
plied.) Thus, the statute contemplates the filing of one 
consolidated return in place of many separate returns. 
These returns would, of course, only be due if the indi-
vidual corporations had taxable years, the activities of 
which they were required to report. The statute, there-
fore, requires a "taxable year'' for each member of the 
affiliated group as a prerequisite for inclusion of that 
member's activities in the consolidated return filed for 
that taxable year. 
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POINT II 
THE LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTION PAID TO PLAIN. 
TIFF IS NOT EXEMPT FROM TAXATION UNDER TAX 
COMMISSION FRANCHISE TAX REGULATION NO. 4. 
The Utah franchise tax act does not provide for 
special tax treatment of intercompany transactions re-
ported on consolidated returns. Any exemption appli-
cable to such transactions must be based on the franchise 
tax regulations promulgated by the Tax Commission. 
The question of whether or not the Commission can 
provide by regulation an exemption from income which 
is required by statute to be taxed is uncertain, but does 
not need to be decided in connection with this appeal. 
Section 59-13-23, UCA 1953, provides in part: 
"By Affiliated Group. 
(1) An affiliated group of banks and/or 
other corporation shall, subject to the provisions 
of this section, have the privilege of making a 
consolidated return for any taxable year in lieu 
of separate returns. The making of a consolidated 
return shall be 'Upon the condition that all the cor-
porations which have been members of the affili-
ated group at any time during the taxable year 
for which the return is made consent to all the 
regulations under subsection (2) of this section 
prescribed prior to the making of such return; 
and the making of a consolidated return shall be 
considered as such consent ... 
Rules and Regulations. 
(2) The Tax Commission shall prescribe such 
requlations as it may deem necessary in order that 
th~ tax liability of an affiliated group of banks 
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and/or corporations 1naking a consolidated return 
and of each corporation in the groitp, both during 
and after the peri.od of affilation, may be deter-
1.n i11ed, computed, assessed, collected and adjusted 
in such manner as clearly to ref le ct the income .am,.d 
to prei:ent avoidance of tax liabilty . .. " (Empha-
sis added.) 
Thus, the privilege of filing consolidated returns 
is only granted in lieu of making separate returns and 
ei:en then it is conditioned upon all corporations involved 
consenting to all of the regulations under Subsection (2) 
prescribed prior to the making of such return. 
Therefore, even if Article 34 of Regulation 4 does 
establish an exemption for intercompany transactions 
reported on consolidated returns, this exemption cannot 
be broader than the regulation upon which it is based. 
The privilege of filing a consolidated return is condi-
tioned upon consent to all of Regulation 4, not just the 
portion which exempts intercompany transactions. 
The term "consolidated return" means any taxable 
year for which a consolidated return is made. See Article 
2, (b), page 43, Franchise Tax Regulations. It has al-
ready been pointed out that the year 1964 was not a 
taxable year for Bennett's even though the consolidated 
return was made for that year. 
In addition, the option to file a consolidated return 
must be exercised at the time of filing the return of the 
parent. At the time of the filing of the parent's return 
in this case, the election was not made to have Bennett's 
income included in the return and, therefore, under the 
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regulation, it cannot be subsequently included. See Arti-
cle 10, Regulation 4, page 43, Ibid. 
A further reason that the Plaintiff cannot prevail 
under the regulation itself is that the term "affiliated 
group'' is defined by regulation as not including cor-
porations not subject to tax under the act. See Regula-
tion 4, Article 2 ( b), page 43, Ibid. Bennett's was not 
subject to tax under the act for the year 1964 because 
it owed no tax on the activities in the year it dissolved 
Therefore, it was not a memher of an affiliated group 
as defined by the regulations during the year in question. 
For these reasons, the exemption is unavailable to 
Plaintiff as it and Bennett's were not members of an 
affiliated group as defined by the regulation at the time 
the liquidating dividend was made. 
POINT III 
THE COURT SHOULD STRICTLY CONSTRUE THE 
CLAIMED EXEMPTION. 
This case presents an unusual situation where the 
authority purporting to establish a tax exemption is 
derived, not from a statute, but from an administrative 
regulation. However, the Commission submits that the 
general rules regarding the construction of such tax 
exemptions apply equally herein. It is well established 
in Utah that where a statute purports to create an ex-
emption from the general application of a revenue law, 
:mch exemption provision is to be strictly construed 
against the one who asserts the claimed exemption. Nor-
ville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.2d 937. 
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The presumption is that all exemptions intended 
to he granted were granted in express terms and that 
language relied upon as creating an exemption must be 
clear so as to not admit reasonable controversy about its 
meaning. All doubts must be resolved against the ex-
emption, and exemptions will not be aided by judicial 
interpretation. Jibdge v. Spencer, 15 Utah 242, 48 Pac. 
1097; Pa·rker v. Quinn, 23 Utah 332, 64 Pac. 961; Elks v. 
Grosbeck, 40 Utah 1, 120 Pac. 192; Norville v. State Tax 
Conunission, 98Utah170, 97 P.2d 937. 
Further support for the proposition of strict con-
struction is found in the statute authorizing the com-
mission to promulgate regulations governing consolidated 
returns. Sec. 59-13-23 (2) UCA 1953 provides in part 
as follows: 
"The Tax Commission shall prescribe such regu-
lations as it may deem necessary in order that 
the tax liability of an affiliated group of . . . 
corporations making a consolidated return ... 
may be determined, computed, assessed, collected 
and adjusted in such a manner as clearly to re-
flect the income and to prevent avoidance of tax 
liability.'' (Emphasis supplied.) 
Thus, in order to comply with the statutory man-
date, the regulations should be interpreted in such a man-
ner as to reflect the income of affiliated corporations 
and to prevent the avoidance of tax liability. 
The Commission submits that because of the rule 
of strict construction an exemption cannot be granted 
to the Plaintiff in this matter where the entire regula-
tion setting up an exemption has not been complied with. 
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CONCLUSION 
\Vhile Regula ti on N" o. + does imrport to exempt 
certain intercompany transadions, this exemption, if 
valid, cannot be broader than the regulation creating it. 
Plaintiff cannot qualify for the exemption because it 
made no timely election and because the dividend was 
not made during the consolidated return period from a 
member of the group affiliated with Plaintiff, all of which 
are required by the regulation as well as the statute. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN, 
Attorney General 
F. Burton Howard, 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
